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In the wars of the machine age, as is known, the entire nation -- literally all the production apparatus, from which it is difficult to distinguish clearly the military industry -- participates. In war, both transportation and scientific organizations are at work; therefore, it would be incorrect at present to identify military potential with all the capabilities of the country. Military potential does not exhaust all the capabilities of a country to wage a modern war, but is only one of the most important items among these capabilities. The capacity of the country to wage a successful war depends not only on the military potential, but also on the economic and morale capabilities.

On the other hand, it would be incorrect to limit military potential to the armed forces maintained by the state in times of peace. Military potential includes the following several elements:

First, the regular land, air, and naval forces. These are maintained in times of peace and guarantee the development of mass armed forces in times of war.

Second, the trained military reserve of rank-and-file soldiers and commanding and technical personnel which are built up in time of peace by training in the regular armed forces and by other methods, and also through the consequent pretraining and retraining. In modern circumstances, these reserves are formed with such consideration that not only do they guarantee the development of a mass armed forces in the event of mobilization, but they also satisfy -- with already trained contingents -- the demands of the army and navy for replacements in the course of a prolonged war.

Third, the quantity and quality of different kinds of divisions and other army, aviation, and naval organs, which can be realistically developed in times of war.

Fourth, the weapons and military equipment -- not only that found in the regular armed services, but also the new types -- which can be produced in mass quantity in times of war. It is understood that the degree of mastery, by both regular and reserve personnel, of weapons and equipment is also taken into account.

Fifth, the organizational ability of the commanding staff of the army and navy, the combat readiness of the troops and the state of training of the reserves, and also the state of military skill and the degree of its mastery by the personnel of the armed forces.

Constituent elements of military potential are the reserves of militarily suitable transportation and means of hauling; the military schools, and their student graduating capacity; higher staffs and apparatus of military administration and organization which can be developed in the course of war; military-scientific research institutes, test-firing grounds and aerodromes, and training centers.

To determine accurately the level of military potential it is not sufficient to have in view only the enumeration of the higher elements. The level of military potential to a great degree depends on the morale of the regular personnel and of the trained military reserves, and on the actual possibility of increasing it in time of war.

One cannot accurately determine the level of military potential without also taking into account the degree of industrial preparedness of the country to mass-produce modern arms and combat equipment, and the transportation needed to guarantee the continuous supply of the front with all its needs.

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Thus, the roots of military potential go out into the entire population, and into the social and state structure of the country. The economic potential, with its basic motive force, the working population, and the morale capability of the country are the foundation of military potential which draws from these sources material, human, and morale resources.

V. I. Lenin noted in 1905 that "the tie between the military organization of the country and all of her economic and cultural system never was as close as at the present time." Historical experience has completely confirmed this situation.

Our Soviet state has endured with honor the test of both the Civil and the Great Patriotic Wars. The foremost socialist order was maintained in our country, and the politics and ideology of the Communist Party were the source of continually developing economic and constantly growing morale capabilities of the USSR. This gave the Soviet Army and Navy insurmountable strength in the battle against the aggressors. Thus, in the years of the Great Patriotic War, while carrying on a cruel struggle against the strongest army of the capitalist world -- the German Fascist army -- the Soviet Armed Forces relied on great human reserves which had a high morale, and on the great material-technical reserves which our socialist economy provided. This circumstances played a decisive role in the achievement of victory over the enemy.

II.

In our times, when the technical equipping of the army and navy has grown immeasurably, when almost all the latest achievements in technology -- and the materials which are the product of the most diversified branches of industry -- are used in the armed struggle, the direct and immediate dependence of the military potential on the economic capabilities of the country presents itself in a particularly graphic manner.

A country highly developed economically can build a powerful military potential in the form of technically well-equipped and well-trained regular armed forces and the corresponding reserves, and can have a sufficient number of military-scientific institutes developing new types of weapons, combat equipment, etc. One should note that the inventions and the improvements in the field of arms and military equipment and, of course, the quantitative superiority over the opponent in this realization, depend largely on the economic potentialities of the country.

A great significance has long ago attached itself to the quantity and quality of divisions. The quantity and the quality of divisions depends not only on the presence of human reserves in the country, but also on the country's economic potentialities.

The material-technical supply of the modern rifle division, not to mention mechanized, tank, and, particularly, aviation divisions, has become a complex, costly matter. The navy also requires great material expenditures. In time of war, the development of a large number of modern divisions is possible only through the strength of a populous, economically strong country.

The population of a country is the most important element of the economic potential. The number of inhabitants and their political-morale status determines the possible limits to accumulating a trained military reserve -- one of the basic elements of military potential -- to the quantity and quality of the commanding personnel, and to the extreme limits of the number of divisions to

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be developed in time of war. On the number of inhabitants of a country and their morale depends also the level and the rate of production of arms, combat equipment, all kinds of military supplies, and other material necessary in waging a war.

While holding that military potential is directly connected to the economic potentialities of the country, Soviet military science does not, however, confine itself in this respect only to the purely quantitative side of the matter. As is known, the economic potentialities of a country are not only the determining level of the development of industry, transportation, and agriculture, of the presence of natural resources and supplies of raw materials, but also of the capacity of the state to mobilize most effectively and to use its material resources for the victory over the enemy. The capacity to use the economic potential to a decisive degree in war is determined in a country by the predominant social and state system, and by the politics of the state. Thus, in the years of the Great Patriotic War, relying on the advantage of a socialist system of economy, in the output of arms the Soviet Union was able to surpass Fascist Germany, which depended on the economic resources of almost all of Europe. The Soviet system proved to be the best form for mobilizing all the strength of the people of our country to repulse the aggressor and destroy him.

III.

Military potential depends on the morale capabilities of the country as much as it does on the economic. The morale capabilities of the country under present conditions determine the morale of the army both in times of peace and, particularly, in time of war.

In the middle of the 19th century, states waged war using permanent armies with very long terms of military service. As a rule, in the course of a war, these armies received comparatively small contingents of reinforcements, whose morale condition could not substantially affect the morale spirit of the [regular] troops. An entirely different situation was created in the epoch of imperialism when the regular army in times of war was literally dissolved in the multimillioned mass of conscriptees. The commanding personnel also was considerably supplemented by officers called from the reserves. Consequently, under modern circumstances the morale of the armed forces in time of war is determined by the morale of the people as a whole, by their attitude to the existing social and state system, and by the aims of the war.

Inherent in the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces are, above all, the supreme devotion to the great cause of Communism and to their socialist Fatherland and the readiness to defend courageously and skillfully the victories of the Soviet people and the state interests of the USSR, sparing neither their blood nor their lives. The soldiers of the Soviet Armed Forces, as history eloquently attests, manifest in the course of war an unheard of steadfastness, firmness, mass heroism, capacity to endure without complaint all the adversities and dangers of war, and resoluteness to destroy the enemy. These unusual qualities are inherent in all of our people and are the result of the socialist reorganization in our country and of the great work of the Communist Party in the education of the workers. In the course of military service, a series of specific military qualities is instilled in the Soviet people; for example, the strictest military discipline, execution of orders, consciousness of military duty and of military honor, love for military service, combat equipment and weapons, military valor and courage, vigilance, etc.

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The morale of the Soviet Army and Navy draws its force from the vast morale capabilities of our country, having as its bases the most advanced social and state system in the world and the politics and ideology of the Communist Party. By these is determined the high morale-political state of the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces, and their readiness to fight together with the people for the freedom and independence of their Fatherland.

The capitalist order, with its internal contradictions and its antipeople's politics cannot guarantee a high and stable morale potential throughout a period of war. The fate of Fascist Germany and her armies in World War II speaks convincingly of this.

The organizational capabilities of the commanding personnel depend on the morale potential of the country, which also includes the cultural level of the nation. This is clear. Because of the degree of contemporary technical equipping of the armed forces and the complexity of military science ("delo"), only a highly cultured level of conscriptees can facilitate the creation of highly qualified commanding and technical personnel. But an important subjective factor such as the organizational ability of commanding personnel and its military proficiency, as is known, always has played an enormous role in the matter of securing a victory in war. SUVOROV said that "one fights not by number, but by skill." This is true under present conditions. Experience shows that through the skillful utilization of modern armed forces, one can overcome a strong, but a more poorly prepared and less skillful, opponent.

Thus, military potential is found to have a direct dependence on the morale capabilities of the country, which are in turn determined by the existing social and state order, and by the ideology and politics of the state.

IV.

In wars of the machine age, the existing significant morale and economic potentialities of the country cannot alone guarantee her safety without the presence of regular armed forces which are sufficiently strong and always ready for action. In the absence or weakness of the regular army, an army created hurriedly during the fighting will, for a long time, be crude and insufficiently trained, with a low level of organizational ability on the part of the commanding staff. This refers especially to such branches of the armed services as the air and naval forces, which are formed and trained over a period of years.

Without the indispensable regular armed forces, the realization of the morale and economic advantages of the country and of its superiority in human and material reserves is extremely difficult. On the contrary, with a sufficiently strong, combat-ready regular army and navy it is possible to organize from the reserve units within a short time well-mobilized masses of trained military reserves, and to use with the greatest effectiveness the material resources provided by the country for waging a war.

Nevertheless, the role of the regular armed forces is not limited by this. The regular armed forces are simultaneously a large military school which aids in the training and building up in the country of rank-and file reserves, and of technical and commanding personnel. In the regular armed forces new arms and equipment are tested in time of peace, and methods and means of their use in battle are worked out. In the absence of regular armed forces the successful development of military and naval skill would be impossible in time of peace, since it would not have a practical base.

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At the same time, one ought to note that the regular armed forces would quickly disappear in the absence of the mass of trained military reserves of commanding, technical, and rank-and-file personnel, and in the absence of a flow of arms and military equipment from industry in time of war.

And so, to wage a successful modern war there is needed a military potential which depends on the powerful economic and high morale capabilities of the country, including within it a strong regular armed forces.

The wide development of the economic potentialities of the country and the strengthening of her morale capabilities promotes the growth and strengthening of the military potential.

Nevertheless, economic and morale capabilities cannot guarantee the successful waging of war in the absence or weakness of the regular armed forces or of the military potential as a whole.

The Soviet people, under the leadership of the Communist Party, directs its efforts toward building Communism in our country, toward the further development of heavy industry and agriculture, and toward the promotion of the prosperity of all the workers. The Communist Party and the Soviet government persistently conduct a policy of peace; they struggle to attain a business-like collaboration between all the states and people, and for the relaxing international tension. But one ought not to forget that there are forces which will endeavor to impede the attainment of true confidence and cooperation between states.

Therefore, the party, the state, and the Soviet people display the necessary vigilance and preoccupation toward strengthening the defense ability of the Soviet state and with increasing the combat might of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Rallying closely around the Communist Party, with infinite devotion to their socialist Fatherland and to their people, the soldiers of the Army, Air Force, and Navy fulfill with honor and dignity the tasks charged to them, vigilantly standing guard over the constructive labor of the Soviet people and over the safety of our socialist state.

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